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A competitive model of worker replacement and
wage rigidity
Abstract
We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas
(2010) to consider a labor market in which rms can commit to wage con-
tracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are
risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for rms to smooth wages. Real
wages respond in a highly non-linear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward
rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks.
We also consider layo¤s and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding
occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent
evidence.
JEL Codes: E32, J41
Keywords: Labor contracts, business cycle, unemployment, labor hoarding,
downward rigidity, cross-contract restrictions.
I Introduction
In this paper we develop a model in which wages of new hires are not determined
independently of those of ongoing employees. The implication is that if there is a
reason for ongoing wages to be rigid, this may be transmitted to the wages of new
hires if the rm is hiring. Even if the rm is laying o¤ workers, we shall see that its
layo¤ policy also depends on this link.
The crucial assumption that we make is that rms cannot commit to employ-
ment levels. That is, as with at-willcontracting, they cannot commit not to layo¤
a worker. They can commit, however, to wage contracts, current and future. If the
wage for new hires is below that of incumbents, the rm will have an incentive to
replace its incumbents if it can nd suitable applicants. Anticipating this, workers
will have a preference for a contract in which wages of future hires are never below
their own wages, so that the rm will have no incentive to attempt to replace them.
It will turn out that rms o¤er such contracts because the ex ante costs of hiring
are lower by a su¢ cient amount to o¤set having to forgo the potential benet of a
lower wage for new hires in some future states. That is, it will be optimal to satisfy
a no replacement constraint that requires that the wage for new hires is never
below that of incumbents.
We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010),
henceforth MM and ST respectively. In MM overlapping generations of two-period
lived rms interact with innitely lived workers, while in ST both rms and workers
are innitely lived.1 A related argument has been used in the insider-outsider litera-
ture; see Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000).2 We simplify these models to a two-period
1MMs model concerns a frictional labour market; in ST however the context is of a perfectly
competitive labour market, and we adapt the latter approach.
2They allow for separation payments to workers (which we rule out) on the assumption that
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version that is more tractable for our purposes, but the basic ideas are similar.
In adverse future states, because of the no replacement constraint, the rm will
trade-o¤ a desire to smooth the wages of workers in ongoing employment, with the
benets from cutting the wage for new entrants. Treated on their own merit, the
latter would receive a lower wage, but this would take it below the optimal wage
to be paid to incumbents. The upshot is that there is a degree of downward wage
rigidity. The opposite is not true however. In particularly good states there is no
problem in paying a higher wage to new entrants than to incumbents, so the rigidity
only operates in a downward direction.3
Because the wage for new entrants is allocative, the downwardly rigid wage
a¤ects hiring, and increases the variability of both unemployment and vacancies in
response to productivity shocks, a point made also by MM and ST.
Apart from providing an alternative, tractable, version of MM and ST which
captures a similar mechanism,4 we believe that the model furnishes a number of new
insights. One feature of our equilibrium which is a direct implication of the idea of
equal treatment (i.e., when new hire and incumbent wages are tied together) but
which we believe has not been formally analyzed before is that the downward pres-
sure on wages exerted by negative shocks may diminish as shocks worsen. The idea
is that once the no replacement constraint prevents wages from falling as far as they
can, further negative shocks reduce the number of new hires, thus diminishing the
who instigates a separation is not contractible, but the fact of separation is. They show that under
certain conditions optimal separation payments are zero however, because positive payments would
encourage workers to leave when this is undesirable for the rm.
3We shall assume that it is costly or infeasible for workers who quit in the second period to nd
work; this implies that the rm does not have to respond to spot wages being above incumbent
contract wages by raising the incumbent wage. ST allow for ex post worker mobility of the type
assumed in (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991), which implies that wages rise to match outside options.
4For example, MM are only able to numerically analyse a case where transitions between states
have zero probability.
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benets from wage cuts relative to the benets of o¤ering stable wages to incumbent
workers.
A second implication arises from the fact we consider situations where rms are
not hiring, which were not considered in MM and ST.5 For a range of bad shocks,
we nd a zone of inactivity. At the point at which hiring falls to zero, wages of
incumbents are perfectly smoothed (by the logic of the previous paragraph); this
has the implication that the wage is above what incumbents might get if they are
laid o¤. In slightly more adverse states, introducing layo¤s would lead to a discrete
drop in incumbentsutility should they be laid o¤, and from an ex ante perspective it
will be preferable to cut the wages of incumbents. Thus wages fall but employment
is unresponsive as shocks worsen over this range. We argue that recent experience
in the U.K. is consistent with this.
Both of these results suggest a very non-linear response of real wages to the
state of the economy. When output is expanding wages are fully exible upwards.
In recessions real wages fall at rst with no employment e¤ects, but for more severe
shocks wages are not only downward rigid but actually may rise relative to some
less severe shocks. This leads to a potentially large employment response, larger
than would occur in a rst-best outcome (trivially so, as the latter involves full
employment at a xed labor supply). Beyond some point, however, wages will fall
sharply again as rms seek to avoid layo¤s.
When layo¤s do occur they are involuntary (laid-o¤ workers su¤er a discrete
drop in utility) and ine¢ cient in that employment is below rst-best levels. The
fact that layo¤s occur and are ine¢ cient is perhaps surprising in view of the fact
that information is symmetric and wages are contingent.6 The assumption of at-will
5To solve their model, ST have to impose conditions that imply that hiring is always positive.
6Thus the sort of mechanism underlying such layo¤s is not the same as appealing to predeter-
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employment contracting that the rm can decide on employment levels is respon-
sible for this outcome in two ways. It implies that the rm can only prevent layo¤s
by cutting the wage, since it cannot commit to avoid layo¤s. This creates a trade-o¤
between trying to smooth wages and trying to reduce layo¤s, the outcome of which is
a wage below the level in the previous period, but one which is insensitive to shocks
in this range. Secondly, even over this range, the motive not to replace incumbents
prevents rms from bringing in cheaper workers from outside, something that would
be ex ante protable if rms were able to commit not to replace incumbents.7
We argue that there is evidence that wages of new hires are not determined
independently of those already employed in a rm. This point has been made
for example by Bewley (1999) who has argued that internal equity considerations
prevent new hires from being paid a wage below that paid to incumbents.8 Gertler
and Trigari (2009) also argue that wages of new hires do not appear to respond more
to business cycle uctuations than those of ongoing employees.9 We return to this
mined wages which do not respond to productivity or other shocks, as in Hall and Lazear (1984),
for example.
7Schmieder and von Wachter (2010) present the intriguing nding that workers who have re-
ceived wage increases due to tight past labor market conditions, as in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991),
face a higher risk of layo¤. As they state, theirs is the rst study to provide direct evidence that
downward wage rigidities in the form of persistent e¤ects of past favorable unemployment condi-
tions on wages lead to higher incidence of job displacement[p.3]. This seems broadly consistent
with the at-will contracting assumption that rms do not make employment commitments, but
choose employment optimally given the wage, and suggests that downward rigidity is playing an
important role in layo¤s. It however leaves open the question of why rms are not able to cut the
wages of such workers.
8According to Bewley (1999, p.477): "Downward rigidity of the pay of new hires derives from
that of existing employees, because all pay rates within a rm are tied together. Reduced hiring pay
increases di¤erentials between existing and new employees in each job, unless the pay of existing
employees is cut as well.Bewley sees the maintenance of morale to be a major factor in avoiding
pay di¤erentials between new hires and incumbents. He does however nd some evidence, in line
with our hypothesis, that incumbent workers are concerned with replacement under two-tier wage
systems (p. 146). A morale based theory of why new hires cannot be paid less than incumbents
doing the same jobs, would have similar predictions to those we obtain here.
9They estimate the cyclicality of hiring wages in the U.S. by using SIPP (Survey of Income
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question at the end of Section II.
An outline of the paper is as follows. We start by laying out the main assump-
tions of the model. We then consider the case where rms are hiring. We establish
a degree of downward rigidity. Next, we consider the case where rms are neither
hiring nor ring and show that rms cut wages to hold employment constant. We
then consider an example and analyze layo¤ policy. Finally Section III contains
concluding comments.
II The Model
There are two periods t = 1; 2. We assume that each rm and worker lives for
both periods with many rms and workers, with L the ratio of workers to rms. We
identify each rm with an entrepreneur who owns it. In each period a representative
rm operates a decreasing returns technology producing a perishable good, with
production function f (Nt; xt) ; where Nt is the current number of workers employed
at the rm, xt 2 X  R+ is a productivity shock observable at the start of the
period, and @f=@N > 0; @2f=@N2 < 0. (Hours per worker are not variable.)
Current prots are given by f (N; x)   wN , where w denotes the (real) wage paid
in the current period (assuming a uniform wage, which need not hold in period
2). There is no disutility of work, and a worker who is unemployed in any period
and Program Participation) worker data collected at four-month intervals during 1990-1996. They
regress (log) real wage on the unemployment rate, the interaction of the unemployment rate with a
new hire dummy variable, match dummy variables, and other controls including the current tenure
of the match. The estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term is statistically insignicant, and
they conclude that, after we control for compositional e¤ects, new hire wages appear no more
cyclically sensitive than existing workerswages(pp. 73-4). Contrasting evidence is provided in
Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2013), who nd the wage of those hired out of nonemployment to
be quite sensitive to productivity changes. In our model, new hire wages are more variable than
those of incumbents, but this is due to higher hiring wages in booms.
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receives an income of b, so that they would prefer to work for any w > b. We
assume that @f=@N (L; x) > b for all x 2 X so that in a spot market the labor
market would clear at full employment; also higher values of x correspond to better
output shocks: @f=@x (N; x) > 0 and @2f=@N@x > 0. Each worker has a per-period
utility of consumption function v (c), v0 > 0 and v00 < 0, where v0 and v00 denote rst
and second derivatives respectively. Workers cannot borrow or save, so consume all
their current income; we assume for simplicity that there is no discounting of the
future by workers. Entrepreneurs on the other hand are risk-neutral, but also have
a zero discount rate. We assume that x = x1 is xed at t = 1, but at t = 2, x is a
random variable, common across rms, with nite support. Henceforth x without a
subscript will refer to the second period productivity shock.
A rm has a wage policy
 
w1; (w2 (x) ; wh(x))x2X

to which it commits: workers
hired at t = 1 are o¤ered a wage contract (w1; w2) and period 2 hires are o¤ered
wh. A worker who accepts a contract at t = 1 su¤ers exogenous separation from
the rm at the end of the rst period, with probability . In the second period
such unattached workers seek work. Following MM and ST, employment is assumed
to be at will, so in the second period (after observing x) the rm can dismiss a
worker without compensation, and a worker can quit without penalty. We assume
that such workers remain unemployed in their second period. Hence we rule out
on-the-job search, which will imply that quitting is never optimal in period 2.
Thus workers face an exogenous separation risk, and also the possibility that
the rm will dismiss them; in equilibrium we will nd that the latter will only occur
when the rm is laying o¤workers, but we shall see that the possibility that workers
could be replaced by cheaper new hires will constrain the contract (as in MM and
ST).
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Simultaneously with committing to a wage policy at the start of period 1, rms
plan how many hires nt (layo¤s if n2 is negative, where n2    (1  )n1) to make
in period t = 1; 2; n2 depends on x.10 (Where there is no ambiguity we suppress
x in what follows to simplify notation.) We assume that workers can observe n1
when considering whether to accept a contract from the rm (this is only relevant
for computing layo¤ probabilities). We denote the representative rms period t
workforce by Nt, so N1  n1 and N2  (1  )n1 + n2. We denote its wage-
employment policy by  :=
 
w1; (w2 (x) ; wh(x))x2X ; n1; (n2 (x))x2X

.
Let Z2(x) be the utility of a worker in period 2 looking for work in state x. The
value to a worker at t = 1 from being employed by a rm with policy  then is
V1(;Z2 ()) := v (w1) + Ex[Z2 (x) + (1  )v (w2 (x))] (1)
if the worker only faces a separation risk, where Ex denotes expectation with respect
to the distribution of states x. On the other hand, if layo¤s or replacement occur in
some states, then in such states the nal term inside the square brackets must be
averaged with (1  ) v (b) using the probability of this happening.
Markets are assumed to be competitive. The period 1 labor market clears but
the period 2 market may not. We denote the equilibrium supply price of period 2
labor by ws, that is any rm o¤ering at least this amount can hire as much as it
wants, otherwise it cannot hire at all. We look for a symmetric equilibrium and use
a hat to denote equilibrium values of rmschoices. We dene
Z2 (x) :=
b^n2= (L) v (w^h) + 1  b^n2= (L) v (b) ; (2)
where to allow for layo¤s we dene b^n2 := max fn^2; 0g, so b^n2= (L) is the proportion
of workers exogenously separated after period 1 who nd work (recall that other
10By the at will contractingassumption, the rm cannot commit to future employment levels,
so we will require below that these must be ex post prot maximizing. We are ignoring the
possibility of replacement in specifying these plans, as this will be shown to be suboptimal below.
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separated workers remain unemployed). That is, if the labor market clears then
ws = w^h (i.e., the common hiring wage o¤ered in a symmetric equilibrium) and
Z2 (x) = v (w^h), while if it does not,11 we assume that ws = b;12 if n2 > 0 then Z2(x)
lies between v (w^h) and v(b); if there are layo¤s (n2 < 0) then Z2 (x) = v(b).
As mentioned above, at t = 2 the rm can, by at will contracting, choose
whether to replace its incumbents or not. If wh  w2 rms will have no incentive
to do this, but for ws  wh < w2 the rm will replace its incumbent workforce. If
wh = w2 then the rm is indi¤erent, and we assume that replacement does not occur.
In our framework, however, it is always weakly ex ante optimal to avoid replacement.
In period 1 workers would anticipate replacement in period 2, and given they receive
b in that case, they would weakly prefer to receive wh as wh  ws  b. So the rm
could reduce w2 to wh, which would not reduce the ex ante value of the contract
V1 (; Z2) in (1), and the rm would still be able to hire at wh, so its prots cannot
be reduced by this change. Given that wages are committed to ex ante, by setting
wh  w2 in state x a rm e¤ectively commits to not replace its incumbents, and we
refer to this inequality as the no replacement constraint. We henceforth impose this
constraint on the rm.13,14
11Excess demand in the labor market cannot arise in this competitive model as a very small
increase in wh would allow an individual rm to hire as much as it wishes; such a deviation would
always be protable.
12While this seems the natural assumption, results are not sensitive to this precise formulation.
13Note that the rm can only be indi¤erent about satisfying the constraint if wh = b, as otherwise
period 1 hires are made strictly better o¤ by the change, which would allow the rm to cut period
1 wages. We shall see that imposing the constraint leads to an optimal wh > b, even when there
is unemployment. In this case violating the constraint would strictly reduce prots.
14Given that the no replacement constraint is imposed, although the rm cannot commit to
period 2 employment, the utility of period 1 hires does not depend on planned employment provided
there are no layo¤s, that is, in this case there is no time consistency issue.
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If there are no layo¤s in period 2 (n2 (x)  0 for all x), a rms prot is:
 () = (f (n1;x1)  w1n1) + (3)
Ex [(f ((1  )n1 + n2 (x) ;x)  w2 (x) (1  )n1   wh (x)n2 (x))] :
Otherwise, in any state where layo¤s occur, in the expression for second period prot
wage costs are replaced by w2((1  )n1 + n2). The rm solves
max

 () (Problem A)
subject to
V1 (; Z2)  V1 (^; Z2) ; (4)
wh (x)  w2 (x) (5)
for all x, and, if n2 (x) > 0;
wh (x)  ws (x) ; (6)
while if n2 (x)  0,
n2 2 arg max
n2
f(f ((1  )n1 + n2)  w2 ((1  )n1 + n2))g : (7)
Here, (4) requires that the rm o¤ers to period 1 hires at least what they can get
elsewhere, (5) is the no replacement constraint, (6) requires that if the rm intends
to hire in period 2 , it must o¤er at least the supply price of labor, while (7) requires
that if there are layo¤s that n2 must be optimal given w2 (ex post optimality is
satised when n2 > 0 and so does not need to be imposed as mentioned in Footnote
14). We dene an equilibrium as follows:
Denition 1 A (symmetric) equilibrium consists of a wage-employment policy ^
which solves Problem A, and such that n1 = L and n2  L, and where Z2 (x) is
given by (2) for all x, and
ws (x) =

w^h
b
if
n2 = L
n2 < L
: (8)
9
Positive Hiring
For the moment we shall ignore layo¤s and consider a state x with n2 > 0. This
is appropriate provided that the period 2 shock x is not too bad and the rate of
exogenous separation is su¢ ciently high. The explicit restrictions that imply n2 > 0
will be established later.
Anticipating future results, aggregate period 2 labor demandN2 will be (f 0)
 1 (wh)
(we suppress x) where f 0  @f=@N (N; x), i.e., will be on the standard labor demand
curve, and we denote by wspot (x) the wage that would clear the market in state x,
i.e., wspot (x) := @f=@N (L;x) > b.15 Consequently either wh = wspot and the labor
market clears, in which case ws = wspot, or wh > wspot, the labor market fails to
clear, in which case ws = b < wspot. We cannot have wh < wspot as that would imply
excess demand for labor, and as mentioned earlier, this cannot arise (see Footnote
11).
We proceed heuristically (see the Appendix for formal proofs).
In period 2 in any state x, given n1 and w1, following MM it can be shown that
the rm must locally maximize ex post period 2 prots plus weighted incumbent
utility. In particular, given it is optimal not to replace, and recall we are provisionally
assuming that the shock is such that labor demand exceeds (1 )n1 (so that period
15@f=@n (L;x) > b by an earlier assumption. The intuition is clear: given the rm wants to
hire and has committed to wh, it will always hire up to the point where the marginal product
of labor equals this wage. This is true whether or not the wage is against the no replacement
constraint. As already remarked, in this case it does not matter that the rm cannot commit to
period 2 employment as the utility of period 1 hires does not depend on n2. (With layo¤s the lack
of commitment will a¤ect the solution.)
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1 hires only face the exogenous separation risk), it must maximize
^(:) := f ((1  )n1 + n2;x)  w2(1  )n1   whn2 +
(1=v0 (w1))n1 ((1  ) v (w2) + Z2 (x)) (9)
with respect to n2; wh; w2; wh  w2 subject to wh  wsh. The last term in (9)
includes the continuation utility of an incumbent, taking into account the separation
possibility, and multiplied by the number of period 1 hires. The intuition here is
that any change which a¤ects the utility of the rms old workers can be o¤set by a
change in the rst period wage, leaving V1 unchanged (and hence n1). Multiplying
the utility change through by the inverse of rst period marginal utility then converts
it (for a small change) to the rst period wage saving per worker. If this was not
satised then prots can be increased.
There are three cases to consider:
(A) The no replacement constraintwh  w2 is slack in state x. Given that
@^=@wh < 0 and wh > w2, it would pay to cut wh whenever wh > ws, and so
wh = w
s. Then di¤erentiating (9) with respect to w2 yields the FOC:
(1  )n1 = n1 (1=v0 (w1)) ((1  ) v0 (w2)) ; (10)
so that w1 = w2 (< wh). Intuitively the rm should stabilize the wages of the rst
period hires if there is no cost to doing this. In this case, also di¤erentiating (9)
with respect to n2, we get
f 0 (N2) = wh (11)
where recall that N2  (1  )n1 + n2, and as wh = ws we get that wh = wspot (and
there is full employment).16
16Recall f 0 (L) =: wspot, and ws > wspot is impossible from (8), while wh = ws < wspot implies,
from (11), N2 > L; which is also impossible.
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Intuitively, labor demand in period 2 is su¢ ciently high that there is full em-
ployment and to hire rms must pay a wage above w1. Then there is no reason
not to o¤er incumbents a constant wage, w2 = w1, as this doesnt violate the no
replacement constraint.
(B) Both wh  w2 and wh  ws are binding at the optimum. So wh = w2 = ws;
and (11) holds, and hence there is full employment (wh = ws implies this). It must
be that ws  w1 since otherwise from (10) cutting w2 would increase ^ without
violating any constraints.
Intuitively this is an intermediate case, still with full employment, but now the
spot wage is somewhat below w1; and rms o¤er a new hire wage equal to the spot
wage. To avoid violating the no replacement constraint incumbents are paid the
same, i.e., less than w1, so wage smoothing is not perfect, but rms want to avail
themselves of the opportunity to employ new hires at a wage below w1.
(C) If on the other hand wh  w2 is binding at the optimum but wh > ws, then
setting w2 = wh and di¤erentiating (9) with respect to wh:
n1 (1=v
0 (w1)) ((1  ) v0 (wh)) N2 = 0: (12)
Di¤erentiating (9) with respect to n2 we get (11) again (consequently as noted
earlier, period 2 employment is always on the labor demand function when n2 > 0).
Substitute for N2 from (11) in (12), recalling that N2 = (1  )n1 + n2:
0 =
n1
v0 (w1)
(1  )v0 (wh)  (f 0) 1 (wh) =: g(wh;n1; w1; x): (13)
The rst term in the denition of g captures the e¤ect of raising period 2 incumbent
wages by a small amount on reducing the period 1 wage bill; the second term is the
aggregate period 2 labor demand, and so is the extra period 2 wage bill given that
the new hire wage also rises by the same amount as the incumbent wage to avoid
12
violating the no replacement constraint. If, say, g > 0, holding employment constant
while increasing period 2 wages would lead to an overall lower wage bill, and vice
versa if g < 0. Solving g (wh;n1; w1; x) = 0 yields wh(= w2) = wdh (n1; w1; x) :=
g 1 (0;n1; w1; x).
Intuitively, the spot wage is su¢ ciently low that rms do not want to cut wages
that far. That is, because wh  ws is not binding, wages can be cut, but there is
a trade-o¤: cutting wh obviously reduces the wages that must be paid to period 2
hires, but there is a cost imposed on period 1 hires who will also have their period
2 wages cut to avoid violating the no-replacement constraint, and thus must receive
compensation for this variability in their wage prole. At wd these two e¤ects just
balance, and rms do not want to cut wages further, even though they could hire
at a lower wage. This implies the wage exhibits downward rigidity (the value of ws
per se has no e¤ect on it) and there is (involuntary) unemployment.
Assumption 1 We assume henceforth @g(wd;L;w1; x)=@wh < 0.
This follows provided workers are su¢ ciently risk-averse and/or labor demand
is su¢ ciently inelastic. It guarantees that wd is unique.
We can summarise the cases A, B and C in a single proposition with the aid
of a reference value for the newhire wage, w, dened as follows. w solves (13) but
where the labor demand term (f 0) 1 (wh) is replaced by full-employment demand L:
L
v0 (w1)
(1  )v0 (w)  L = 0; (14)
i.e.,
(1  )v0 (w) = v0 (w1) :
In the proposition it is shown that Case C occurs when the spot wage is below w,
and Case B when the spot wage lies between w and w1. It also strengthens the
13
forgoing discussion (proof in the Appendix). Note that in equilibrium n1 = L so
unemployment can only arise in period 2.
Proposition 1 Suppose, in an equilibrium, hiring is positive in state x at period 2.
If in this state wspot  w^1 then w^h = wspot, w^2 = w^1 and there is full employment,
N2 = L (case A). If w  wspot < w^1 then w^h = w^2 = wspot and N2 = L (case B).
If wspot < w then w^1 > w^h = w^2 = wd (L; w^1; x) > w and N2 < L (case C). Hiring
is positive in state x if and only if labor demand setting wh equal to w^1 (i.e., not
necessarily at the equilibrium level) exceeds (1  )L.
Thus, given w^1, in any state for which labor demand is high enough that the
spot wage wspot would exceed w^1, new hire wages will be at the spot wage and the in-
cumbentswages are perfectly smoothed: w^2 = w^1; there will be full employment.17
This is how a policy would look even if the rm could commit to not replace in-
cumbents and could therefore undercut their wages; in these states the replacement
problem does not matter. For a somewhat lower spot wage, the new hire wage will
equal the incumbent wage and be at the spot wage. The costs of reducing the in-
cumbents wage below w^1 is second-order when ws is close to w^1, whereas the cost
of setting the new hire wage wh above the supply price ws is a rst-order cost, so
given the constraint wh  w2, wh = w2 = wspot is optimal.
However, for low enough labor demand, wspot < w; as explained above, the
costs of reducing wage smoothing further would more than o¤set the gain from
17If such a state was anticipated with a su¢ ciently high probability, then it might appear that
a worker who quit at the same time as the exogenous separations occur could be better o¤ as they
would receive a higher period 2 wage. While we have ruled this out by assumption, it could be
justied by supposing there is a high enough mobility cost incurred by the worker. Going to the
other extreme and allowing full ex post mobility of labour, as in Snell and Thomas (2010), would
eliminate region A as it would impose an extra constraint, wh  w2 (so that wh = w2 always). We
conjecture however that the other qualitative results would still hold.
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cheaper new hires, and wh (= w2) is set above wspot and there is unemployment.
Moreover the wage is above w. The intuition is as follows. Start from that x for
which wspot = w; so there is (just) full employment. At a lower value of x, as hiring
is lower than would be the case at full employment, the trade-o¤ between lowering
the wage to benet from cheaper new hires and the desire to stabilize wages, moves
in favour of the latter, since rms make fewer hires and so benet less from a lower
wage.
This intuition suggests that in region C the wage might increase as the produc-
tivity shock worsens, as again at lower period 2 employment levels the gain from a
lower wage is diminished given that a smaller number of new hires is being made.
This is conrmed in the next proposition (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 2 For any two states at date 2, x; x0 with x < x0, and such that for both
states hiring is positive and wspot < w; (i.e., we are in case C), then wd (L; w^1; x) >
wd (L; w^1; x
0).
A nal general result when there is positive hiring at date 2 in all states is that
w^1 is no lower than the marginal product of labour in period 1.
Proposition 3 Suppose in an equilibrium, hiring is positive in each state x at period
2. Then @f (n1; x1) =@N  w^1. This is strict whenever w^h > w^2 in at least one state
at date 2.
The intuition is that in bad states of the world the no replacement constraint
binds and so wh = w2; there is no benet or cost to carrying an extra worker into
period 2 as one new hire less or more can be made at the same wage. In good states
when wh > w2, however, there is a benet in having an extra incumbent worker
15
given that they will receive a lower wage than new hires. It follows that the value
to hiring an extra worker in period 1 may be greater than their period 1 product,
and the wage may not be allocative.
Example 4 Assume each rm has technology given by, at time t = 1; 2 :
f(Nt; xt) = xt log (Nt) ; (15)
where x1 > 0; x2 = x > 0; and recall x1 is xed. Assume also that workers have per-
period utility functions of the constant relative risk aversion family with coe¢ cient
 > 1, described by v(c) = c1 =(1   ); with v0 (c) = c . In this case then
wspot (x) = x=L.
In Case C we have wspot < w; wh = w2 = wd and N2 < L. We can write (13)
for n1 = L as
L(1  )w h
w^ 1
  x
wh
= 0;
and solving for wh we get
wh = w
d =

(1  )Lw^1
x
 1
 1
:
Also
w = w^1 (1  )
1
 :
Moreover, Assumption 1 is satised, given  > 1.18
No hiring
For a bad enough shock in period 2; the rm may prefer not to hire. This occurs,
from Proposition 1, if labor demand at wh = w^1 is no greater than (1  )L.19
18After manipulation we get @g(wh = wd;n1; w1; x)=@wh =  (   1)x

L(1 )w1
x
  2 1
< 0:
19In the example, this is when x=w^1  (1  )L:
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Suppose that x = x is such that we are just on the limit of the positive hiring
regime, that is, from when labor demand at wh = w^1 equals (1  )L.
Proposition 5 There exists an interval of values for x, [x; x] with x < x, such
that n^2 (x) = 0 for any x 2 [x; x].
At x we have wd = w^1. Then for x 2 [x; x] there is neither hiring nor ring, so
that as x falls, the wage falls from w^1 to maintain labor demand at (1  )L.20 Over
this range we observe labor hoardingin the sense that worse states do not lead to
layo¤s (although employment remains below the rst-best level). The intuition is as
follows. At x, w^2 = w^1 and n^2 = 0. For x slightly below x; if the rm maintained
w2 = w^1 then there would be layo¤s, n2 < 0. However the rm would su¤er
only a second order loss were it to increase employment (reduce layo¤s from this
point); however incumbents would get a rst-order benet as their lay-o¤probability
falls (their utility falls when laid-o¤ as w2 > b). The rm cannot commit to do
this, but it can reduce the wage slightly from w^1 to achieve the same employment
outcome; this also only has a second-order cost for wage smoothing. Thus the rm
can strictly increase prots by holding n2 = 0 in this way. Only when productivity
falls su¢ ciently below x, and w2 is much lower than w^1 so the wage smoothing costs
of further wage cuts become too large, will the rm start laying o¤ its workforce.
When layo¤s occur, the same logic implies that w^2 < w^1: if to the contrary
w^2 = w^1 then a small cut in the wage would increase prots by diminishing the
lay-o¤ rate.
20Given we are analysing a nite set of states, this proposition might be empty if X \ [x; x] is
itself empty. In a continuous state version of the model, however, the same result would hold and
su¢ ciently adverse shocks would imply that this region occurs with positive probability. Moreover,
[x; x] depends only on w^1, not on X, and provided there are uniform bounds on X; we can show
that for su¢ ciently dense X a similar conclusion applies in the nite state case.
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There is some evidence that, consistent with this range, during the great reces-
sion in the U.K. substantial wage cuts went alongside the unusually small reductions
in employment given the path of output. (Crawford, Jin, and Simpson 2013) ar-
gue that the evidence is consistent with labor hoarding, particularly by smaller and
medium sized rms.21
Numerical example
To illustrate the solution, in the example suppose that L = 1; w^1 = 1, the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion  = 2,  = 0:2; b = 0:6. The value for  is plausible on an
annual basis, given that it e¤ectively excludes quits due to on the job search and
layo¤s. The value for b gives a replacement ratio of 60% relative to period 1 wages:
The solution for period 2 wages as a function of possible values for x is illustrated
in Figure 1. Here the spot wage equals x. Starting from the top, when x > 1 we are
in case A, and the spot wage exceeds w^1 so w^h = x > w^2 = 1. In case B the spot
wage below w^1 reduces both w^h and w^2 as the no replacement constraint bites. For
values of x below w = 0:894, optimal wages are above the spot wage and there is
involuntary unemployment. The gap between the wage and the (dotted) spot wage
line determines the amount of unemployment, given that the spot wage line shows
the level of wages needed for full employment. As explained earlier, wages rise as
x falls in case C. Thus unemployment rises as x falls in this region. For still lower
values of x; we have a range of (employment) inactivity, where wages fall sharply
enough to just maintain employment of all incumbents; equivalently unemployment
is constant. Finally layo¤s occur, and we nd that wages are constant as x falls
21Of course in our model employment is also constant at full employment. However, in a model
with an upward sloping labour supply curve this would not be the case, while the labor hoard-
ing region we have identied would still imply employment that is unrepsonsive to a range of
productivity shocks. The point is that in the latter case, we are o¤ the labor suply curve.
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Figure 1: Wages and productivity ( = 2;  = 0:2)
further so in this range negative shocks feed directly in to increases in layo¤s and
further increases in unemployment.22
We stress three points: rst, the period 2 wage is allocative in all regions, and
whenever it lies above the spot wage line (the 45 degree line), unemployment exists
and is involuntary, and employment is ine¢ ciently low; employment is excessively
sensitive to productivity shocks in case C and when n2 < 0; this is trivial here
as employment is constant at L in the rst best allocation. Second, and related,
is that not only is there ine¢ ciently low hiring over some range where hiring is
positive (i.e., in case C), but also employment is ine¢ ciently low over the whole
range where n2 = 0 and where layo¤s occur (recall that provided x > b = 0:6, the
rst-best allocation would have full employment). Thirdly, even when n2  0, the
no-replacement constraint matters because it prevents rms from bringing new hires
22Solving (25) in the Appendix for the functional forms of Example 4, we get
b
 
(   1)w 1   w 2

+ b=w2 = 0, so the solution for w2 is independent of x.
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Figure 2: Wages and productivity ( = 4;  = 0:3)
in at a lower wage.23
In Figure 2, risk aversion is higher ( = 4) and the rate of separation is some-
what higher, at 30% ( = 0:3). While  is high for measured risk aversion, estimated
elasticities of intertemporal consumption (the inverse of ) are frequently very low
(e.g., Hall (1988)). In this case wages fall less far before case C occurs; intuitively
the higher risk aversion means that the incentive to stabilize wages overrides the
benet of cheaper new hire wages when the spot wage is closer to w1.
There is little empirical work that breaks down the response of real wages to
di¤erent parts of the cycle. One recent exception is Snell and Stüber (2013) who
analyze wages from the IAB Employee History File (BEH)  a comprehensive Social
Security based administrative dataset for Germany. Controlling for match quality
23In fact, in the absence of at-will contracting, that is, if it could commit to employment levels,
the rm would have no layo¤s, given the rst best involves full-employment. It would pay its
incumbents the same wage as in period 1, and it would hire in new workers at a potentially lower
wage.
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(see for example Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013)) at a detailed level (worker-rm-
occupation) they extract year e¤ects from a panel regression of real wages on match
dummies and other controls for the years 1977-2008. They nd a strong asymmetry
in the response of these real wage year e¤ects to the aggregate unemployment rate;
when unemployment is below its long run mean the response is around  0:25 and
insignicant whilst when unemployment is above its long run mean the response is
strongly signicant at  1:84. Strong upward movements of wages in upswings with
rigidity in downswings is reasonably consistent with the predictions of our model. In
a further analysis they nd the incremental cyclical response for new hires and for
low tenure workers, respectively, are both insignicant in fact these incremental
year e¤ects are virtually white noise. This second nding lends some support to our
theoretical prediction that new hire wages do not undercut those of incumbents in
downswings.24
III Concluding Comments
It has been argued that the assumption that rms cannot commit not to replace has
major implications for the nature of employment contracts. Not only does this lead
to rms choosing not to pay new hires less than ongoing employees, but it also implies
that real wages have a substantial degree of downward rigidity. This implies excessive
sensitivity of employment to shocks. Nevertheless the relationship is highly non-
linear. At the point where new hiring falls to zero, and for a range of worse shocks,
it is optimal to o¤er incumbents (i.e., those who were not exogenously separated
24This second empirical feature is inconsistent with our result that wh > w2 in case A. However,
as discussed in Footnote 3, modifying the model to allow for incumbents to costlessly move to
other rms in period 2 would imply wh = w2 for high shocks, but otherwise we conjecture would
leave the main results unchanged.
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from the previous period) job security and cut wages to preserve employment. We
term this labor hoarding. For shocks such that layo¤s occur, though, wages remain
rigid, and again employment is excessively sensitive to shocks.
In future work we aim to test the more nuanced relationship between shocks
and wages/employment that the model predicts. Further theoretical extensions that
are desirable include considering asymmetric shocks, frictional labor markets, and a
multi-period model with the same characteristics.
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IV Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1
We derive necessary conditions for the rm by considering the following Lagrangian
for Problem A, assuming for ease of presentation an interior solution with n2 (x) > 0,
all x.25
L (w1; n1; (wh (x) ; w2 (x) ; n2 (x) ; ; x; x)x2X)
= (f (n1;x1)  w1n1) + Ex [f ((1  )n1 + n2 (x))  w2 (x) (1  )n1   wh (x)n2 (x)] +
 [v (w1) + E[Z2 (x) + (1  )v (w2 (x))]  V1 (^; Z2)] +
Exx [wh (x)  w2 (x)] + Exx [wh (x)  ws (x)] ;
where ; x; x  0. This leads to the FOCs:
w1 :  n1 + v0 (w1) = 0; (16)
n1 : f
0 (n1;x1)  w1 + E [(1  )f 0 (N2)  w2(1  )] = 0; (17)
wh :  n2 + x + x = 0; (18)
w2 :  (1  )n1 + (1  )v0 (w2 (x))  x = 0; (19)
and
n2 : f
0 (N2)  wh = 0: (20)
Clearly  > 0: (a)26 Suppose that x = 0 and x > 0. From (16) and (19),
v0 (w1) = v0 (w2 (x))  x
 (1  ) ; (21)
25If n2  0 in states other than x; the Lagrangian is modied as in the proof of Proposition 5,
and the argument below is una¤ected since the FOCs arising in other states at t = 2 are not used..
26Cases (a) to (c) correspond to (A) to (C) in the text, except for the knife-edge case where
wspot = w.
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and consequently
v0 (w1) = v0 (w2 (x)) ;
so that wh (x) = ws (x)  w2 (x) = w1.
(b) Suppose that x > 0 and x > 0. From (21), w1 > w2 (x) = wh (x) = w
s (x).
(c) Suppose that x > 0 and x = 0: Then, using (16), (18), (20), and wh = w2
in (19):
 (1  )n1 + (1  )n1v0 (wh (x)) =v0 (w1) 

(f 0) 1 (wh)  (1  )n1

= 0;
which yields (13) in the text. And from (21), w1 > w2 (x) = wh (x)  ws (x) :
Next, consider equilibrium. From (20), period 2 total labor demand N2 (x) is
on the usual labor demand (marginal productivity) curve, so that if (I) w^h (x) >
wspot (x) ; N2 (x) < L and hence ws (x) = b < wspot (x) < w^h (x) (the rst inequality
by assumption), while if (II) w^h (x) = wspot (x), N2 (x) = L and hence ws (x) =
w^h (x) = w
spot (x) : w^h (x) < w
spot (x) cannot arise in equilibrium, as discussed in
the text. Note then that w^h (x) = ws (x) implies case (II) while w^h (x) > ws (x)
implies case (I).
Consider now the three possibilities addressed in the proposition. First suppose
that in equilibrium, in state x, wspot (x)  w^1. Case (b) implies w^1 > w^2 (x) =
w^h (x) = w
s (x), which from the above paragraph implies (II), so w^h (x) = wspot (x),
but then we get w^h (x) = wspot (x)  w^1 > w^h (x), a contradiction. Likewise, case
(c) implies either w^1 > w^2 (x) = w^h (x) = ws (x), so the same argument implies
a contradiction, or w^1 > w^2 (x) = w^h (x) > ws (x), so case (I), and ws (x) = b
< wspot (x) < w^h (x), but then w^1 > w^h (x) > wspot (x), a contradiction. We conclude
that only case (a) is compatible.
Next suppose that wspot (x) < w^1. This is incompatible with case (a) since the
25
latter implies that w^h (x) = ws (x)  w^2 (x) = w^1, and so case (II), ws (x) = w^h (x) =
wspot (x); another contradiction.
If w < wspot (x) < w^1, then at wh = w; as, by w < wspot (x), (f 0)
 1 (w) > L; we
have g (w;L; w^1; x) < 0 in view of (13) and (14). By Assumption 1, wdh (L; w^1; x) <
w; so if we are in case (c), then we would have w^h (x) = wdh (L; w^1; x) < w
spot (x),
which is impossible; so we are in Case (b).
Finally if wspot (x)  w: then at wh = w; as, by wspot (x)  w, (f 0) 1 (w)  L
and comparing (13) and (14), we have g (w;L; w^1; x)  0. Suppose we are in case
(b), which recall implies case (II), and so w^h (x) = wspot (x)  w. By Assumption
1, g (w^h (x) ;L; w^1; x)  0 (since otherwise there would exist a solution to (13) with
@g(wd;n1; w1; x)=@wh > 0), i.e.,
(1  )n1v0 (w^h (x)) =v0 (w^1)  (f 0) 1 (w^h (x))  0: (22)
Using (16), (18), (20), and w^h = w^2 in (19),
(1  )n1v0 (w^h (x)) =v0 (w^1)  (f 0) 1 (w^h (x)) + x = 0;
which contradicts (22) as x > 0 in case (b). So we are in case (c) and w^h = w^2 =
wdh (L; w^1; x). If w
spot (x) = w, then w^h = w as (f 0)
 1 (w) = L; so in view of (13) and
(14) we have g (w;L; w^1; x) = 0: Thus N2 = L. If wspot (x) < w, then at wh = w;
we have g (w;L; w^1; x) > 0; using the argument above (22). By Assumption 1 and
continuity of g, a solution to g (wh;L; w^1; x) = 0 must then have wh = wd > w.
wd > w implies (f 0) 1 (w^d) < L so N2 < L.
To prove the nal claim of the proposition, consider the case wspot (x) < w
(other cases are straightforward). Note that (f 0) 1 (w^1) > (1  )L implies that at
wh = w^1; g (w^1;L; w^1; x) = (1  )L  (f 0) 1 (w^1) < 0. Given that g (w;L; w^1; x) >
0, then by continuity a solution for g (wh;L; w^1; x) = 0 exists between w and w^1;
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and so at wd, total labour demand (f 0) 1 (wd) > (1  )L and hiring is positive.
Conversely, suppose that (f 0) 1 (w^1)  (1  )L. Then g (w^1;L; w^1; x) = (1  )L
  (f 0) 1 (w^1)  _0. Given Assumption 1, no solution exists between w and w^1,
contradicting the solution for the case wspot (x) < w. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Totally di¤erentiating (13) with n1 set equal to L and noting that w1 will be constant,
yields
dwd
dx
=
@2f=@N@x
1  (1  )(v0 (w^1)) 1v00 (wd) @2f=@N2 :
By Assumption 1, @g(wd;n1; w1; x)=@wh = (1 )(v0 (w1)) 1v00
 
wd
  (@2f=@N2) 1 <
0: Given that @2f=@N@x > 0 and @2f=@N2 < 0; it follows straightforwardly that
dwd=dx < 0; which establishes the claim of the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
We see thatE [(1  )f 0 (N2)  w2(1  )]  0 given that f 0 (N2) = wh from (20) and
wh  w2 from the no replacement constraint. Thus from (17) @f (n1; x1) =@N  w1.
This is strict whenever wh > w2 in at least one state. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
For states with n2  0 the relevant terms inside the expectation operator in the
Lagrangian in the proof of Proposition 1 are replaced by

f

(f 0) 1 (w2)

  w2

(f 0) 1 (w2)

+


Z2 +

1     (f 0) 1 (w2)=n1

v (b) + ((f 0) 1 (w2)=n1)v (w2)

+
x((1  )n1   (f 0) 1 (w2));
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and x = x = 0. Note that wh no longer appears, we have added a constraint
that n2  0 with multiplier x  0, and we have substituted N2 = (f 0) 1 (w2)
from (7) (i.e., to reect the at-will employment assumption implies that the rm
cannot commit to n2 but must choose optimally given w2). In the expression for
expected worker utility,
 
1     (f 0) 1 (w2)=n1

is the probability of layo¤ while
(f 0) 1 (w2)=n1 is the probability of being retained. We get the FOC
 N2 + (N2=n1)v0 (w2) +
(f 0 (N2)  w2 +  ( n1v (b) + n1v (w2))  x)

d (f 0) 1 (w2)=dw2

= 0: (23)
We are in equilibrium, so n1 = L. From (16)  = L=v0 (w1) ; and noting that
f 0 (N2)  w2 = 0, (23) can be rewritten as:
(f 0) 1 (w2))

v0 (w2)
v0 (w1)
  1

+
(v0 (w1))
 1
( v (b) + v (w2))  x

d (f 0) 1 (w2)=dw2

= 0: (24)
For (24) to have a solution with x = 0, we must have
(f 0) 1 (w2)) (v0 (w2)  v0 (w1)) =   (v (w2)  v (b))

d (f 0) 1 (w2)=dw2

: (25)
At x, there are neither layo¤s nor new hires: n2 = 0, i.e., N2 = L, and w2 =
w1. Consider x < x: By the last claim in Proposition 1, n2  0. It cannot be that
w2  w1, as this implies that (v0 (w2) =v0 (w1)  1)  0 and since d (f 0) 1 (w2)=dw2 <
0 we have from (24),
(v0 (w1))
 1
( v (b) + v (w2))  x  0;
and given that v (b) < v (w^1)  v (w2) ; x > 0 (so N2 = L), but N2 = (f 0) 1 (w2) <
L by @2f=@N@x > 0, a contradiction.
Next, consider a sequence such that xr ! x from below; if there are solutions
to the FOCs with x = 0 at each x
r then there exist solutions wr2  w1 to (25) for
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each xr satisfying
(f 0) 1 (w2))  (1  )L; (26)
in this case wr2 ! w1 (otherwise along a subsequence limwr2 < w1 and so
lim (f 0) 1 (wr2)) > (1  )L, and thus (26) is eventually violated along the sequence).
By continuity of all the functions in (25) in x and w2, the L.H.S. converges to zero,
the R.H.S. to a positive number, so (25) is eventually violated along the sequence,
a contradiction. Hence no such sequence exists, and so there exists an interval of
values for x, (x; x) say, such that for x 2 (x; x) ; x > 0, and the claim of the
proposition follows (for a closed interval, as x > 0 at x
). Q.E.D.
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